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Abstract
Scientific literature may be biased because of the internal validity of studies being compromised by
different forms of measurement error, and/or because of the selective reporting of positive and
'statistically significant' results. While the first source of bias might be prevented, and in some cases
corrected to a degree, the second represents a pervasive problem afflicting the medical literature;
a situation that can only be 'corrected' by a change in the mindset of authors, reviewers, and
editors. This review focuses on the concepts of confounding, selection bias and information bias,
utilising explanatory examples and simple rules to recognise and, when possible, to correct for
them. Confounding is a mixing of effects resulting from an imbalance of some of the causes of
disease across the compared groups. It can be prevented by randomization and restriction, and
controlled by stratification, standardization or by using multivariable techniques. Selection bias
stems from an absence of comparability among the groups being studied, while information bias
arises from distorted information collection techniques. Publication bias of medical research results
can invalidate evidence-based medicine, when a researcher attempting to collect all the published
studies on a specific topic actually gathers only a proportion of them, usually the ones reporting
'positive' results. The selective publication of 'statistically significant' results represents a problem
that researchers and readers have to be aware of in order to face the entire body of published
medical evidence with a degree of scepticism.
Background
Epidemiology is largely a non-experimental discipline
and although this has often been perceived as a weakness,
probably its most important strength is in that observa-
tions are made on samples of real-world populations. In
fact, the limited opportunity for experiments in epidemi-
ological research has lead to a very critical theoretical
understanding of the different types and sources of error
[1].
Clinicians and surgeons face two important questions as
they read medical research: is the report believable, and, if
so, is it relevant to my practice? Uncritical acceptance of
published research has led to serious errors and squan-
dered resources [2,3]. In this review, we will examine
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simple checklist for readers to judge reported associations.
Additionally, we will describe another kind of bias, one
that does not affect the validity of a single study but rather
the dissemination of research findings: publication bias,
which can be described as the selective submission or
publication of study results based on the direction or
strength of the study's findings.
Modern definition of bias in epidemiology
Important discussions on bias took place as the concept of
study design in modern epidemiology was refined. In the
1950s, the introduction of the randomised controlled trial
(RCT) and its assigned role as a 'gold standard' for medical
research lead to the anticipation that the validity of a
study could be improved in circumstances where rand-
omization was feasible. In the 1970s, during general dis-
cussions on the sources of biases, taxonomies of bias were
proposed by Murphy and Sackett [4,5], with the latter pro-
posing a 'catalogue' of 35 different types of bias. Modern
definitions of bias, however, tend to be restricted to those
categories that have a logical basis. According to Roth-
man, bias is a systematic error that afflicts study design,
thus affecting the validity of the study itself [6]. An epide-
miologic study can be viewed as an attempt to obtain an
epidemiologic measure, with the 'correct' values
unknown, therefore epidemiologists attempt to reduce
this source of error through the careful design and analysis
of the study itself.
A study can be biased due to an inability to completely
control a confounding factor (comparison bias), the way in
which the subjects have been selected (selection bias), or
the way the study variables are measured (information bias/
misclassification). A completely different source of error in
epidemiological measures is random error, which affects
the precision of a study, usually expressed by the use of
confidence intervals (or ideally confidence interval func-
tions). While this type of error is not discussed in this
review it is important to note that random error is closely
associated with sample size and it approaches zero as the
study size increases, systematic errors on the other hand
are not affected by study size.
Confounding
Confounding can be defined as a bias in estimating an
epidemiologic measure of effect resulting from an imbal-
ance of other causes of disease in the compared groups
[7]. It can also be defined as a mixing or blurring of effects,
which comes about when a researcher attempts to relate
an exposure to an outcome, but actually measures the
effect of a third factor, termed a confounding variable [8].
Confounding is the most likely cause of a spurious associ-
ation, which occurs when one factor, which is not in itself
causally related to a disease, is unfortunately related to a
range of other factors that do increase disease risk.
Before we proceed to defining a confounder, it would per-
haps be easier to illustrate the concept with a simple
example. Results from a large case-control study of Intra-
Uterine Devices (IUDs) indicated a significant increase in
salpingitis soon after insertion [9]. However, among mar-
ried or cohabiting woman with only one reported sex
partners in the past 6 months, no significant increase in
risk was evident [10]. In the study, exposure to sexually
transmitted diseases apparently confounded the associa-
tion. Even among woman at lower risk for salpingitis, fre-
quent coitus might increase risk of infection [11], and few
studies have controlled for this variable.
So, for a characteristic to be a confounder in a particular
study, it must simultaneously meet three criteria [7]:
1. it must be associated with the outcome in terms of
prognosis or susceptibility
2. it must be associated with the exposure
3. it cannot be an intermediate cause, or in other words it
must not be an effect of the exposure
We should however, keep in mind that not every predictor
of disease occurrence is a confounding factor. For con-
founding to occur, a predictor of disease occurrence must
also be in a state of imbalance across the exposure catego-
ries [7]. For example, let us suppose that age is a risk factor
for a given disease, as it usually is. Then age would not be
a confounder unless the age distribution of the people in
the two exposure categories differed, which would result
in the comparison of two different age groups. Under
these circumstances, the effect of exposure will be con-
founded by the effects of age to an extent that would
depend upon on the strength of the relationship between
age and the disease, as well as the extent of the age imbal-
ance across the exposure categories [7]. As such, informa-
tion on the distribution of potential confounders with in
the two comparison groups, is usually provided in the first
table of a paper (Table 1) [12], where the most common
strategy for identifying important imbalances for some of
the covariates between the two groups is derived from the
use of significance tests such as the χ2 test (for dichoto-
mous variable) or t test (for continuous variables), with
their associated p-values, or the effect measure e.g. Odds
Ratios, which is usually preferable, since it provides both
the strength of an association and the precision of the esti-
mate. However, we should keep in mind that in order for
a characteristic to be considered as a confounder, it also
needs to meet the two additional criteria previously men-
tioned.Page 2 of 8
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potential confounders, the imperfect state of knowledge
means that some characteristics related to the outcome
may not have been previously discovered (unknown con-
founders) [13]. In RCTs, all potential confounders
(known and unknown) are expected to be evenly distrib-
uted between the groups being compared, thanks to the
randomisation procedure. On the other hand, observa-
tional studies in epidemiology (mainly case-control and
cohort-studies) are not protected in the same way and are
especially vulnerable to unknown confounders. For exam-
ple: in 1991 a meta-analysis investigating the association
between the use of hormone replacement therapy (HRT)
and the risk of coronary heart disease concluded that HRT
halved the risk [RR= 0.50; 95% confidence interval (CI):
0.43–0.56] [14]. Results of a large RCT, however, were dis-
appointing, showing no clear benefit (OR= 1.11; 95%CI:
0.96–1.30) [15], and women were left wondering what
they should do. This illustrates that associations reported
in observational studies but not confirmed in RCTs tend
to be due to exposures that are related to socioeconomic
and behavioural measures that are in turn related to dis-
ease (confounding).
Most probably, woman who use HRT are less likely to be
smokers, more likely to exercise regularly, and less likely
to come from lower socioeconomic classes, all of which
reduce the risk of coronary heart disease. As Davey Smith
and Ebrahim said, 'the inadequately recognised truth is
that we live in associational world – people who are dis-
Table 1: Baseline characteristics of head and neck cancer cases and controls according collected variables[12]
Variable Cases n (%) Controls n (%) p value*
Age groups (years) 0.168
< 60 35 (28.2) 88 (35.3)
> 60 89 (71.8) 161 (64.7)
Total 124 249
Gender 0.123
Male 105 (84.7) 194 (77.9)
Female 19 (15.3) 55 (22.1)
Total 124 249
Weight ± SD (Kg) 72.70 ± 12.40 73.09 ± 12.15 0.775†
Alcohol consumption 0.001
No alcohol 37 (30.3) 107 (44.8)
1–30 gr/die 53 (43.4) 122 (51)
> 30 gr/die 32 (26.2) 10 (4.2)
Total 122 239
Fruit intake 0.197
≤ 1/day 69 (57.0) 153 (76.5)
>1/day 52 (43.0) 86 (23.5)
Total 121 239
Vegetable intake 0.678
≤ 1/day 95 (78.5) 183 (76.6)
>1/day 26 (21.5) 56 (23.4)
Total 121 239
Smoking status 0.001
Never smokers 17 (14.0) 133 (55.6)
Ever smokers 104 (86.0) 106 (44.4)
Total 121 239
Physical activity 0.001
Never 109 (90.8) 172 (72.0)
1–4 times/month 2 (1.7) 43 (18.0)
>4 times/month 9 (7.5) 24 (10.0)
Total 120 239
Solvents 0.003
No 115 (95.0) 238 (99.6)
Yes 6 (5.0) 1 (0.4)
Total 121 239
Paints 0.004
No 114 (94.2) 238 (99.2)
Yes 7 (5.8) 2 (0.8)
Total 121 240
* χ2 test used to test statistically significant differences between groups; † Student's t-testPage 3 of 8
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other regards, since the forces that structure life chances
and experience tend to ensure that some folk get the worst
of all thing' [16].
What can we do about confounding?
Given the limited range of confounders measured in
many studies and the inevitable stable degree of measure-
ment error in assessing potential confounders, the stand-
ard statistical techniques poorly 'control' for
confounding. It is however, worthwhile to describe the
current methods being used to prevent and control for
confounding. Beside the widespread concept of prevent-
ing confounding with the randomization (random assign-
ment of subjects to experimental groups), which is only
feasible in RCTs, confounding can also be efficiently pre-
vented by the use of restriction.
Restriction represents the simplest approach: for example,
if alcohol consumption is suspected to be a confounding
factor in an association aiming to study the effect of
tobacco smoking to laryngeal cancer, a study can enrol
only non-drinkers. Restriction is a very efficient way to
prevent confounding in any study, however often not
used by epidemiologists who advocate that the represent-
ativeness of a study might be compromised by restriction.
As Rothman states, this is indeed a fallacious way to think
about the scientific inference, 'whose aim is to infer an
abstract theory which is not tied to a specific population,
and not to look for inferring a conclusion that would
apply to a specific target population' [7].
Another way to prevent confounding is by matching,
which is very common in case-control studies. Matching
consists of selecting a comparison series that has an iden-
tical distribution to that of the index series for one or
more covariates [7]. For example, in a case-control study
where smoking is deemed a confounding factor, cases and
controls can be matched by smoking status, so that for
each case who smokes, a control who smokes is found.
This approach, however, has at least three drawbacks: if
matching is done for several potential confounders, the
recruitment process might be difficult; by definition, it is
impossible to examine the effect of a matched variable
and lastly, which is less intuitive, in case-control studies
matching can introduce confounding if the matching var-
iable is highly correlated with the exposure [6]
When controlling for confounding, three of the methods
can be employed: stratification, standardization and multi-
variable modelling. The first and last one are usually more
commonly adopted. Stratification can be considered as a
form of post-hoc restriction, done during the analysis. For
example, results can be stratified by levels of the con-
founding factor. The Mantel-Haenszel (MH) procedure
[17] combines the various strata into a summary statistics
that describes the effect. If the MH adjusted effect differs
substantially from the crude effect, then confounding is
deemed present, and in these cases the adjusted estimate
is the better estimate to use. Let's consider the fictitious
example in Table 2, derived from Grimes DA [8]. The use
of IUDs in this hypothetical cohort of 2,000 women is
associated with the development of salpingitis (RR= 3.0;
95%CI: 1.7–5.4). However, when the data are stratified
according to the number of partners, the resulting RR is
1.0 in each of the stratum, indicating no association
between the IUD and salpingitis. The MH weighted RR,
which controls for the confounding effect, is 1.0 (95%CI:
0.5–2.0), indicating that the apparent increase in risk was
all due to confounding bias.
In multivariable techniques, mathematical modelling
examines the potential effect of one variable while simul-
taneously controlling for the effect of many others. Its
major advantage is that it can control for more factors
than stratification can, so that, for example, in a study
investigating the association between oral contraceptive
use and ovarian cancer risk, the investigator can simulta-
neously control for the effects of age, race, family history,
parity, etc. One of the main drawbacks from the investiga-
tors viewpoint is the loss of hands-on feel for the data [8].
Selection bias
'Selection biases are distortions that result from proce-
dures used to select subjects and from factors that influ-
ence study participation' [7]. It usually occurs because the
relationship between the exposure and the disease is dif-
ferent for those who do and those who theoretically could
participate in the study, including those who do not take
part. Selection bias can be related to the selection of cases
(people with disease) or controls (people without the dis-
ease under study) in case-controls studies; the different
probabilities of selecting people exposed or not exposed
to a specific risk (or protective) factor in cohort-studies;
due to a high proportion of individuals lost to follow-up
or to a mistake in the analysis phase (e.g., do not adhere
to the intent-to-treat principle) in prospective studies.
Because the association between exposure and disease
among non-participants is usually unknown, the presence
of selection bias is usually inferred, rather than observed
[7]. In case-control studies, for example, if there is a differ-
ent proportion of responders in the case series than in the
control series, a selection bias might occur. If the propor-
tion of responders is higher in the case series (e.g. 95%)
and lower in the control ones (e.g. 70%), there would be
the possibility that non-responders could have a different
exposure history, and this could affect the real association
measure between the exposure and the disease. A typical
method used to recognise this is to compare respondersPage 4 of 8
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be related to the main variable of interest. In a paper by De
Vito et al. [18], aiming to evaluate the risk factors for obes-
ity in children and adolescents, the authors calculated that
a population of 2,053 students would need to be
recruited, but only 1,357 students (66% of the sampled
population) entered the study. They were unable to recruit
the remaining 696 children as their parents did not pro-
vide consent, however the possible bias introduced by the
high proportion of non-responders might be negated
because, with respect to mean age, gender, and socio-eco-
nomic factors, the non-responders were similar to the
children who did enter the study.
A well-recognised form of selection bias comes from the
self-selection of participants in some studies (healthy vol-
unteer effect), or from the selection of healthier individuals
by the investigator. In many studies relating to worker
health the comparison of the death rate of workers with
those of the general population (healthy worker effect) is
biased because the general population contains many
people that cannot work because of some form of illness.
Berkson's bias
A particular type of selection bias was described by Berk-
son in 1946, also known as admission-rate bias [19].
Many researchers prefer to select the control series within
the hospital, instead of selecting them from the general
population from which cases arise. According to Berkson,
the relative prevalence of disease x in a group of patients
who are hospitalised for disease y is inherently biased
when compared with the population served by the hospi-
tal. In other words, this bias results from different rates of
hospital admission for cases and controls. In fact, Berk-
son's argument applies in particular to hospital-based
case-control studies in which one or more risk factors are
studied in relation to the risk of a specific disease. Hospi-
tal rates depend on several circumstances, such as symp-
toms severity, ability to cure the disease and the
reputation of a specific hospital regarding the treatment of
a specific disease. Moreover, if a patient has more than
one disease simultaneously, each disease could present
with differing degrees of severity, with the direct conse-
quence of this being a higher percentage of patients with
multiple diagnoses within the hospital. It can be assumed
that a hospitalised patient would have a higher likelihood
of being exposed to a specific risk factor under study, with
respect to the non-hospitalized population. Hence a dis-
crepancy between hospitalised populations and source
populations for the cases exists. If we would like to study
the potential influence of a risk factor on a specific dis-
ease, then using controls derived from a hospital popula-
tion could artificially increase the exposure rates amongst
controls. In a case-control study using hospital controls,
conducted by Sadetzki et al. [20], researchers investigated
the role of several risk factors on the development of blad-
Table 2: Example of confounding in a hypothetical cohort study of intrauterine device use and salpingitis [8]
Salpingitis
Yes No Total Proportion with salpingintis
All women (n = 2,000) Use of IUD Yes 45 955 1,000 4·5 %
No 15 985 1,000 1·5 %
Salpingitis
Yes No Total Proportion with salpingintis
Women with 1 sexual partner (n = 1,200) Use of IUD Yes 3 297 300 1·0%
No 9 891 900 1·0%
 (95% CI 0.27-3.67)                            
Salpingitis
Yes No Total Proportion with salpingintis
Women with >1 sexual partner (n = 800) Use of IUD Yes 42 658 700 6·0 %
No 6 94 100 6·0 %
 (95% CI 0.43-2.29)                            
Crude RR   CI = = −
4 5
1 5
3 0 95 1 7 5 4
. %
. %
. ( % . . )
RR = =
1 0
1 0
1 0
. %
. %
.
RR = =
6 0
6 0
1 0
. %
. %
.Page 5 of 8
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ated with a non-significant 30% increased risk of
developing bladder cancer (OR = 1.3; 95% CI: 0.8 – 2.5).
Later Sadetzki et al. re-analysed the data, considering the
possibility that a Berkson bias could have occurred in the
previous analysis [21]. They removed patients with pul-
monary disease from the control series, because the prob-
ability of these patients being exposed to tobacco smoking
is higher than in the non-hospitalized population. After
controlling for this possible source of bias, they found a
significantly increased risk of bladder cancer for people
exposed to tobacco (OR = 1.78; 95% CI: 1.05 – 2.99).
Information bias
Information bias results from the incorrect determination
of outcome and/or exposure, which can results in the mis-
classification of the exposure or the outcome of interest.
There are two major types of misclassification bias [22]:
• Non-differential misclassification bias: when the misclassi-
fication is the same across the groups to be compared, in
a manner that is not dependent on the exposure or disease
state. For example, exposure is equally misclassified in
cases and controls because a questionnaire is not properly
designed to facilitate the collection of the level of the
exposure, or when after the collection, some arbitrary cut-
off value is used. For binary variables the estimate is
biased toward the null value; however, for variables with
more than two categories (polytomous) this rule may not
hold and an away from the null bias can be obtained [23].
• Differential misclassification bias: when misclassification
is different in the groups to be compared, usually occur-
ring when the probability to properly detect an outcome
depends on the exposure or disease state. The result is that
the estimate is biased in either direction, toward the null
or away from the null. Two common sub-categories of dif-
ferential misclassification are detection bias and recall
bias. The first one arises when a different way of measur-
ing a variable among two groups is employed. If, as an
example, in a case-control study, the cases are in-patients
in a certain hospital and the researchers are interested in
measuring blood pressure, we can expect an accurate
measure, while in population controls the measurement
could involve the self-use of blood pressure cuffs and con-
sequently higher or lower levels of blood pressure may be
detected. This type of bias can be corrected for after adjust-
ing the recorded levels to that of a predetermined "nor-
mal" value [24].
In most cases, however, it is not possible to correct meas-
urement bias (i.e., in measuring the height of people with
their shoes on, in order to avoid measurement bias we
must know the height of the shoe's heel, however, the eas-
iest solution would be to measure the peoples height
without shoes), therefore, efforts to avoid this type of mis-
classification should be taken in the design of the study.
Sensitivity analyses, however, might help to quantify and
possibly remove both selection and information bias
[25]. A study conducted by La Torre at al. [26], carried out
in Central Italian prisons, showed a prevalence of serop-
ositivity of 26% for HBV, 28.2% for HCV and 5.4% for
HIV. However, the data regarding the prevalence of these
three viruses could represent a biased estimation of the
phenomenon, as screening for these infections is not
mandatory for all prisoners (HIV test in 47% of the total
of prisoners). In this study it is possible that drug addicts
were more likely to be given a HIV, HBV and HCV test
(diagnostic suspicion bias) and as such prevalence rates
may have been overestimated [8]. If a sensitivity analysis
had been undertaken, based on the assumption that all
prisoners not given a test were seronegative, then the
authors would have found prevalence rates of 10.9%,
11.6%, and 2.45% respectively.
Recall bias is a differential misclassification bias that
occurs in case-control studies, and eventuates when there
is a difference in the accuracy and completeness of expo-
sure information between cases and controls; as cases
tend to think more about the possible factors affecting
their disease status than controls, searching for all possi-
ble explanations for its development.
Thus, it is plausible that cases recall previous exposure to
risk factors better than controls. For example, a recall bias
could occur if the researchers are studying the possible
association between some risk factors and congenital
anomalies. In such cases, mothers with abnormal babies
tend to cogitate deeper and have a higher motivation for
searching their memories to identify possible explana-
tions for the infant's disease. A particular situation can
arise in case-control studies in which cases are deceased
[27], and the researcher needs to select controls in a more
appropriate way. In this case, 'next of kin' responders need
to be selected for both cases and controls; the appropriate
choice of controls would be to select dead controls. But,
even if surrogate responders are involved, the investigator
needs to know that the completeness and the detail of the
answer depends on several factors, such as the type of
kinsfolk (brothers tend to recall better childhood experi-
ences, while husbands and wives answer questions related
to adulthood better) or the gender of the responders [28].
Other ways of reducing recall bias can involve collecting
information on past exposures obtained from sources
independent of a person's memory (e.g. administrative
databank), blinding interviews (i.e. without knowledge of
disease status) and using standard questionnaires and
measurement tools for exposure [29].Page 6 of 8
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Publication bias may be seen as a type of selection bias
afflicting the scientific literature. It has long been recog-
nised that only a proportion of research projects ulti-
mately reach publication in an indexed journal [30].
Scherer et al showed that only about half of abstracts pre-
sented at conferences are later published in full. Similarly,
20% of trials funded by the National Institutes of Health
remained unpublished several years after completion
[31,32]. The fact that a substantial proportion of studies
remain unpublished, even a decade after they have been
completed and analysed is of concern, as potentially
important information remains hidden from reviewers.
Making the situation worse, is the issue that the dissemi-
nation of research findings is not a random process; rather
it is strongly influenced by the nature and direction of the
results.
For many years investigators have raised concerns that
studies with 'negative' results may remain unpublished
and their failure to appear in the literature can distort the
conclusions that we obtain from clinical experiments
regarding best practice [33]. In a 1979 article on "The 'file
drawer' problem and tolerance for null results", Rosenthal
described a gloomy scenario where "the journals are filled
with the 5 per cent of the studies that show Type I errors,
while the file drawers back at the lab are filled with the
95% of the studies that show non significant (e.g., p >
0.05) results" [34]. It is now well established that the
probability of publication may be a function of the esti-
mated intervention effect θ for whatever reason, with
studies showing 'significant' results more likely to be pub-
lished than those presenting 'negative' results [35], for
example, in the field of emergency medicine, around 80%
of the published literature shows 'statistically' significant
results [36].
'Significant' results tend to be published in international
journals, while 'non-significant results', when published,
tend to appear in less renowned international journals or
in the local literature, resulting in language bias (the
"tower of Babel" bias) [37]. The opposite phenomenon, a
reverse tower of Babel bias, nevertheless has also been
described in which most of the locally produced and pub-
lished literature is spuriously statistically significant [38].
However, ascertaining the extent of this type of bias is dif-
ficult, and typically we have no idea to what extent
unpublished data distorts the literature. Retrieving
unpublished data is currently very problematic, however
unpublished results often represents 'negative' results
from none-the-less well-conducted studies. Whittington
et al [39] found that published data, on which clinical
guidelines have been based, showed the drug fluoxetine
to be advantageous is treating childhood depression,
while additional unpublished studies reversed this result.
The Lancet editorial [40] drew attention to the seriousness
of these findings. In the last few years, however, many
journals implemented dedicated sections to the publica-
tion of "null results", most often in the format brief
papers. Even though this phenomenon appears admirable
at a first sight, it confirms the connate vocation to dedicate
more space to the reporting of positive studies, over stud-
ies that are equal in terms of power and quality [41].
Why do 'negative' results remain unpublished? The most
reasonable explanations for this is that authors may fail to
write them up and submit them to journals, as results
such as these (from intervention or non-experimental
studies) are reviewed less favourably, or because editors
simply don't want to publish negative results. The peer
review process is notoriously unreliable and susceptible to
subjectivity, bias and conflict of interest [30].
In conclusion, a research environment that promotes and
rewards only results that reach formal statistical signifi-
cance is likely to foster data dredging and will create a dis-
torted literature with very low credibility [41] and we need
to be made aware of this in today's world efficacious med-
ical care and evidence-based guidelines, which are after all
meant to be based on the synthesized evidence from pub-
lished studies.
Conclusion
Here we have defined a simple checklist that can help
identify potential confounders, as well as selection and
information bias in published scientific literature. Fur-
thermore, we have briefly shown that the concept of pub-
lication bias represents a problem that we all need to be
concerned about, and in order to eliminate this issue there
needs to be change in all of our mindsets.
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